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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-1814 
_______________ 
 
DANITA HAYER, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND 
DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-00251) 
District Judge: Hon. Peter G. Sheridan 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2012 
 
BEFORE: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and COWEN,  
 
Circuit Judges 
 (Filed:  July 31, 2012) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge
  Plaintiff, who is African-American, alleged that defendant retaliated and 
. 
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discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 
10:5-1, et seq. The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim; following a trial on plaintiff’s discrimination claim, a jury 
returned a verdict in favor of defendant. After the jury returned its verdict, plaintiff filed a 
motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, and alternatively, 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district court denied plaintiff’s 
motions. Plaintiff’s appeal is limited to her discrimination claim. She argues that the 
district court erroneously denied her motions and erred in admitting certain evidence, 
requiring a new trial on her discrimination claim. For the following reasons, we will 
affirm the district court’s judgment. 
(A)  Our review of a district court’s grant or denial of a judgment as a matter of 
law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 is plenary. Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2000). As plaintiff acknowledges in her brief, “[t]he rule 
that a post-trial Rule 50 motion can only be made on grounds specifically advanced in a 
motion for a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff’s case is the settled law of this circuit.” 
Kutner Buick, Inc. v. Am. Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations 
omitted). Plaintiff did not make a Rule 50 motion prior to the case being submitted to the 
jury. The reason plaintiff advances for failing to do so is that it was “obvious to 
[plaintiff’s] counsel that his contemplated [Rule 50] motion would be similarly dealt with 
by the Court,” as the defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss, which was denied.  
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Plaintiff’s reason for not making a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the 
case is illogical. And even if counsel correctly believed that such a motion would be 
fruitless before the district court, making the motion serves the purpose of preserving the 
issue for appeal. Consequently, this reason is insufficient to justify a departure from 
clearly settled law of this circuit. The district court did not err in denying plaintiff’s Rule 
50 motion; we will affirm the district court’s judgment.   
(B) Plaintiff additionally argues that the district court erred in denying her Rule 
59 motion for a new trial on the grounds that 1) the testimony of defendant’s witness, 
Laxmi Vazirani, defendant’s manager of Affirmative Action Equal Employment 
Opportunity during the relevant time period (“Vazirani”), was not stricken from the 
record; 2) evidence that another employee, who is Caucasian, was treated more favorably 
requires a judgment in her favor; and 3) the jury selection process violated her equal 
protection rights. She additionally argues that a new trial should be granted because the 
district court erroneously admitted into evidence the EEOC’s Right to Sue Letter (“EEOC 
Letter”) over her trial objection. Generally, the denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial 
and a ruling on the admission of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lazaridis 
v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (rulings on Rule 59 motions reviewed for 
abuse of discretion); Coleman v. Home Depot, 306 F.3d 1333, 1341 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(admission of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion). To the extent that a different 
standard applies, it is noted. 
Plaintiff contends that Vazirani’s testimony regarding the investigation she 
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conducted should have been stricken because Vazirani’s investigation was flawed and in 
violation of EEOC guidelines. Plaintiff did not object to or make a motion to strike this 
evidence during trial. Nevertheless, the district court considered plaintiff’s argument in 
deciding her Rule 59 motion. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
judgment. Plaintiff’s argument is relevant to the weight to afford Vazirani’s testimony, 
not its admissibility. She had an opportunity to cross-examine Vazirani as to the 
deficiencies of the investigation and make an argument to the jury about the weight it 
should afford her testimony. Plaintiff cites no authority supporting her position that 
testimony based on a flawed investigation renders the evidence inadmissible. As a result, 
the admission of this evidence does not warrant granting a new trial. 
We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s Rule 
59 motion on the ground that there was evidence of defendant’s more favorable treatment 
of another employee who is Caucasian. It is not for us to weigh the evidence to determine 
whether we agree with the jury’s verdict; we only determine whether “there exists that 
minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support the jury’s finding.” Roebuck v. 
Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 731 (3d Cir. 1988). The record supports the jury’s conclusion 
that plaintiff was not being treated differently because of her race. Comparator evidence 
is not dispositive of liability, particularly where, as here, the evidence regarding the 
comparator and as a whole reveals a legitimate question as to whether the actions taken 
against plaintiff were because of her race. Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s 
judgment on this issue as well. 
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Plaintiff’s final argument raised in her Rule 59 motion and before us on appeal is 
that the jury selection process violated her right to equal protection because the jury did 
not represent a fair cross-section of the community. Because this argument is based on the 
interpretation and application of a legal precept, our review is plenary. Koshatka v. Phila. 
Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985). To prevail on this claim, plaintiff 
must show that the underrepresentation resulted from “purposeful discrimination” by 
demonstrating (1) “the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the 
community;” (2) “the representation of this group in venires from which juries are 
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community;” and (3) “this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group 
in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Plaintiff’s 
counsel highlights several factors that might explain the disparity he identifies between 
the percentage of African-Americans in the community and the percentage of the eligible 
African-American jurors. While the system might not be perfect, we do not have the 
benefit of any expert statistical analysis or opinion and counsel’s own analysis is no 
substitute. Further, the disparity identified by counsel and the factors that might explain it 
do not establish that the jury selection process is intended to systematically exclude 
African-Americans from jury pools. And there is no evidence to suggest that the jury 
selection process was not random. Therefore, we reject plaintiff’s argument for a new 
trial on this ground. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that a new trial is warranted because the district court 
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allowed the EEOC Letter to be admitted into evidence. Plaintiff did not raise this 
argument in her Rule 59 motion before the district court, but objected to the EEOC 
Letter’s admission during trial. We will review it under an abuse of discretion standard. In 
support of her argument that the EEOC Letter was erroneously admitted, plaintiff merely 
states, “The Right to Sue letter’s admission violated FRE 401, 403 Evans v. Port 
Authority, 273 F.3d 346, 350 nn.324 [sic] (3d Cir. 2001) and Coleman v. Home Depot, 
306 F.3d
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment will be affirmed.   
 1333 (3d Cir. 2002).” (Pl. Br. 23.) Neither Coleman nor Evans is persuasive or 
forecloses the admission of the EEOC Letter in this case. In both of those cases we found 
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of an EEOC right to sue letter. And in 
Coleman we emphasized that whether to admit an EEOC right to sue letter is within the 
discretion of the district court. Coleman, 306 F.3d at 1345. The plaintiff has given us no 
reason to conclude that the probative value of the admission of the EEOC Letter is 
“substantially outweighed” by its prejudicial effect. And our independent review of the 
record reveals no abuse of discretion in the district court’s implicit finding that the EEOC 
Letter was admissible under Rule 403. Consequently, we need not decide whether 
plaintiff’s failure to raise this argument in her Rule 59 motion before the district court 
forecloses her from making the argument on appeal because, regardless, the admission of 
the EEOC Letter cannot be a basis on which to grant a new trial. 
